Taiwan Strait Crisis or Tech Cold War

Ehsan Soltani

In a world where technology plays a crucial role in economic and political supremacy, advances in artificial intelligence, information and communication technology, and all cutting-edge technologies require more powerful and faster computing and data storage systems. Microprocessors and memories made from silicon chips are needed for data processing and storage, forming the foundation of all modern technologies.

The technological superiority of China is one of the most important concerns of the United States. Although the dispute between China and the U.S. is rooted in Taiwan's independence, technological rivalry and Taiwan's ability to produce advanced silicon chips have exacerbated the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The export of silicon chips to China, which is essential to Taiwan's economy, is one of the main drivers of the U.S.-China conflict, particularly because these chips are needed by China to compete in high-tech production. TSMC, the largest contract manufacturer of sophisticated chips in the world with a dominant global share, is located in Taiwan.

Although the high cost of political and economic risks caused by the escalation of the conflict in the Taiwan Strait keeps the current crisis from intensifying, the technological war and tug-of-war between the United States and China regarding China's access to key technologies is likely to continue.

Greater China: The OPEC of silicon chips

Electronic integrated circuits, also known as ICs, silicon chips, or semiconductor chips, are widely used in a diverse range of applications, from children's toys to sophisticated satellite systems. They are used in a wide variety of consumer electronics, such as smartphones, laptops, and televisions, where they enable the devices to perform a range of functions, from processing data to communicating with other devices. In addition to their use in consumer electronics, ICs are also widely used in industrial applications, such as process control systems, robotics, and factory automation. They are used in medical devices, such as pacemakers and insulin pumps, as well as in automotive systems, such as engine management and safety systems. Integrated circuits are an essential technology that plays a vital role in all aspects of our daily lives.

The majority of the demand for semiconductors is driven by products that are eventually purchased by consumers, such as laptops or smartphones. The emerging markets in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa are increasingly driving consumer demand. The semiconductor market is divided into two main categories: PC/computer and communications, each comprising approximately 30% of the total market. The remaining market is divided among automotive, consumer, and industrial sectors, each accounting for around 12%.

Global trade has experienced a significant shift in favor of technology commodities compared to important traditional commodities such as crude oil. As of 2022, the global trade of integrated circuits totaled an impressive $2,200 billion, surpassing crude oil trade and becoming the first traded goods in the four-digit HS code category. This shift reflects the growing importance of technology and the digital economy in the global trade landscape, as well as the increasing demand for electronic devices across all industries.

In the last two decades, Greater China (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) experienced two-digits annual growth rate in ICs trade. integrated circuits trade of Greater China reached $1,279 billion in 2022, with estimated 55% share of total world. Greater china accounted for almost two-third of global ICs trade growth from 2001 to 2021. The share of Greater China from world ICs trade rose from 11% in 2001 to 57% in 2021, while the share of the U.S. and EU dropped from 32% to 10%.

China and Taiwan have made substantial investments in the integrated circuits industry. They imported more than $300 billion of machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semiconductor devices and integrated circuits over the last decade, which accounts for around half of the total world imports in recent years.
China was the world's top exporter of silicon doped for use in electronics in 2022, with exports valued at $6.4 billion. Meanwhile, China and Taiwan together enjoyed a trade surplus of $4.4 billion in the market for silicon doped.

The importance of Hong Kong as a hub for China's integrated circuits trade cannot be overstated. More than 80% of Hong Kong's ICs exports are directed to China, and Hong Kong's share of China's ICs trade has reached 41% in 2022. This underscores the importance of Hong Kong's strategic location as a gateway to the Chinese market, and its role as a key player in the global ICs supply chain.

The United States was the leading producer of semiconductors until the 1980s. However, since then, its share of global semiconductor industry sales has decreased from 60% in the early 1980s to around 20% in the 2010s, while Asia's share increased from about 10% to nearly 70%, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) based in the United States. In 2022, China alone accounted for 32% of total global semiconductor industry sales, down from 35% in the previous three years. Asia surpassed the Americas (primarily the U.S.) in semiconductor industry sales in 1985, and China overtook the Americas in the 2010s. The semiconductor industry sales ratio of Asia to the Americas (primarily the U.S.) increased from 1.1 in 1985 to a peak of 4.5 in 2008, and then declined to 3.5 in the 2010s. The United States is now seeking to increase its national production and strengthen its position in the semiconductor industry.

Taiwan key role in integrated circuits supply chain

Taiwan's economy has been heavily reliant on the exports of integrated circuits in recent years. From 2001 to 2022, Taiwan's ICs exports experienced an impressive growth rate of 13.2% (CAGR), reaching $184.5 billion in 2022. This growth rate is substantially higher than the growth rate of rest of goods, which stands at 4.8%. As a result of this growth, ICs have become a major contributor to Taiwan's export portfolio, accounting for 38.4% of all exports in 2022, up from 11% in 2001. The majority of Taiwan's ICs are exported to Asia, with China and Hong Kong accounting for around 60% of these exports. In contrast, the share of the United States and European Union in Taiwan's export market has declined from 20% in 2001 to around 4% in recent years. In 2022, the U.S. imported ICs worth $3.2 billion, which accounted for only 1.8% of Taiwan's total exports, indicating that the U.S. does not play a significant role in Taiwan's export market for ICs.

Taiwan trade relies on Asia, and mainly China

Taiwan's trade reached $914 billion in 2022, with $478 billion in exports and $436 billion in imports. The most important export goods category is electrical machinery and equipment and parts, which accounted for about half of Taiwan's exports.
It is noteworthy that Taiwan's trade has been steadily relying more on Asia, with more than two-thirds of total trade in 2022. In contrast, the share of the United States and European Union from Taiwan's total trade dropped from one-third to one-fifth in the last two decades.

Asian countries are now Taiwan's most important export markets, accounting for 70% of its total exports. China and Hong Kong together accounted for 39% of Taiwan's exports in 2022, and played a vital role in Taiwan's balance of payments. In fact, Taiwan had a trade surplus of $100 billion with China and Hong Kong in 2022, compared to a deficit of $41 billion with the rest of the world.

Taiwan is indeed an important source of high technology for China, especially in the semiconductor industry. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest contract chipmaker, is based in Taiwan and supplies chips to many of the world's leading technology companies, including those based in China. Integrated circuits have become Taiwan's dominant export to China and Hong Kong. The share of integrated circuits from total Taiwan exports to China and Hong Kong increased from 14% in 2001 to 57% in 2022. Taiwan benefitted from an $85 billion trade surplus in ICs exports to China and Hong Kong in 2022.

In addition to technology, Taiwan is also an important financial and industrial partner for China. The Taiwan Stock Exchange is one of the largest stock exchanges in Asia, and many Taiwanese companies have significant investments and joint ventures in China. Likewise, Chinese companies have invested in Taiwan and have established partnerships with Taiwanese companies to access their technology and expertise.
In 2022, Taiwan's total outward investment in China reached $203 billion, representing 53% of its cumulative outbound investment. This significant investment by Taiwan accounted for 7.6% of the total FDI (foreign direct investment) received by China. Taiwan's investments in the Mainland China technology sector continue to be strong, despite restrictions on high-tech investment into China from Taiwan.

Taiwan trade with the U.S.

In 2022, Taiwan exported $74.9 billion worth of goods to the United States, including $3.2 billion worth of integrated circuits. Mechanical and electrical machinery are the main export goods to the U.S. Taiwan imported $45.7 billion worth of goods from the U.S. in the same year. The U United States is Taiwan's second-largest trade partner, with a total trade value of $121 billion in 2022, following China with a trade value of $204 billion. Taiwan's share of total U.S. trade in 2022 was 2.6%. Notably, U.S. trade with China was five times greater than with Taiwan in the same year.

U.S. semiconductor industry and trade

The United States' dominance in the semiconductor industry has decreased over the years. Between 2001 and 2008, exports of integrated circuits from the US amounted to around $42 billion, which dropped to around $34.4 billion in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. However, in 2021 and 2022, exports of ICs increased to $53 billion and $51.6 billion, respectively. Despite this recent increase, the US's share of the world's integrated circuits exports has decreased from 30% in the early 1990s to 5% in 2022. Additionally, in 2022, the US experienced a trade deficit in regards to integrated circuits, diodes, transistors, and similar semiconductor devices (HS codes of heading 8541 and 8542).
However, recent years have seen a positive trend for the U.S. semiconductor industry. According to the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the Americas (mainly the U.S.) share of the world's semiconductor industry sales increased from 20% in the 2010s to 24.5% in 2022. Sales for the Americas (mainly the U.S.) semiconductor industry reached $143 billion in 2022, an increase of 22% compared to 2021. Meanwhile, Asia's sales experienced low growth, and China's sales slightly decreased. Between 2019 and 2022, sales for the Americas (mainly the U.S.) semiconductor industry experienced 80% growth compared to around 30% for the rest of the world and China. The Americas (mainly the U.S.) semiconductor industry sales grew 32% more than the rest of the world in 2022 compared to the 2010s.

SIA stated that U.S. semiconductor companies still lead the global market, accounting for nearly half the world's chips sales, while the U.S.-based industry faces significant challenges. The share of modern semiconductor manufacturing capacity located in the U.S. has eroded from 37% in 1990 to 12% today.
According to SIA, U.S.-based companies control nearly half of the semiconductor markets in both Asia and China. The semiconductor industry in the U.S. maintains market share leadership in activities that require high levels of research and development, such as EDA (electronic design automation) and core IP (intellectual property), chip design, and manufacturing equipment. However, the majority of front and back-end manufacturing processes are concentrated in Asia. In fact, 75% of global manufacturing capacity, including wafer fabrication, assembly, testing, and packaging of cutting-edge chips, is concentrated in the region.

With supportive policy measures and actions by the United States government, it is anticipated that the U.S. semiconductor industry will experience a better situation in the coming years. The CHIPS and Science Act launched to boost national R&D, competition, and innovation in 2022. The CHIPS and Science Act combines two parts: The Endless Frontier Act to boost investment in domestic high-tech research and the CHIPS for America Act to bring semiconductor manufacturing back to the U.S. The act is aimed at competing with China. Beyond the United States, government worldwide are also making significant efforts to bolster their positions within the global supply chain, included the European Union (EU Chips Act), South Korea (K-Semiconductor Belt), Japan, Taiwan, India, Mexico, Canada, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Silicon chips war, the new cold war

In 2019, the United States began restricting semiconductor sales to Chinese tech giant Huawei. In 2020, the Trump administration imposed severe sanctions on Huawei, cutting off the company's access to TSMC, which supplied the high-end semiconductors required for its 5G infrastructure business.
In 2022, these restrictions were expanded, limiting Huawei's access to both U.S. consumers and suppliers and imposing a punishing freeze on chip-making equipment across China's semiconductor industry. The growth of Huawei, which had served as a symbol of tech competition between the U.S. and China, has been curtailed.

Between 2018 and 2022, the company's revenue and net income dropped by 12% and 41%, respectively. In 2018 and 2019, Huawei's revenue reached that of Microsoft, but in 2022, it dropped to less than half of Microsoft's revenue. Huawei's smartphone business has been severely impacted by U.S. sanctions and restrictions imposed in 2019. These sanctions restrict Huawei's access to key technologies and components, including Google's Android operating system and certain semiconductor chips. In 2019, Huawei smartphone sales overtook iPhone sales and reached 240 million units. However, due to U.S. sanctions, sales dropped to 35 million units in 2021 and 28 million units in 2022.

In 2022, the United States Department of Commerce implemented controls related to advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing in China. The Biden administration is attempting to restrict China's access to the technology that enables chip production. In October 2022, the United States announced comprehensive export controls that effectively make it extremely difficult for companies to sell chips, chip-making equipment, and software containing U.S. technology to China, regardless of their location in the world. Additionally, it prohibited U.S. citizens and permanent residents from supporting the "development or production" of chips at specific factories in China. Previously, the U.S. targeted individual Chinese companies, but now the focus has expanded to encompass the entire country. The U.S. aims to restrict China's technological development and prevent it from assuming a global technology leadership role.

Historically, the United States supported Taiwan due to Washington's opposition to communist regimes. However, in recent years, this support is primarily driven by Taiwan's dominance in the semiconductor industry. Consequently, China's long-term goal of reunifying with Taiwan now poses a greater threat to U.S. interests. TSMC, the world's largest contract chip manufacturer, supplies semiconductors to most of the largest technology firms. It held a 59% market share of the global foundry (contract chip fabrication) market from the third quarter of 2022 to the first quarter of 2023, while other Taiwan-based manufacturers claimed an additional around 7% of the market. TSMC held approximately 90% of the market share in the most sensitive and advanced segment of the world market, which encompasses nodes ranging from 5nm to 10nm, for made-to-order chips in 2020.

The United States' trade balance of mineral fuels and products went from a $425 billion deficit in 2008 to a positive balance since 2020, and the U.S. has transformed into a net energy exporter. Therefore, the center of U.S. concern has shifted from the Middle East to East Asia, which is the heart of the U.S.-China technology war.

Integrated circuits are more important to China than crude oil. Despite soaring oil prices and the decline in ICs imports, China imported ICs valued at over 14% of crude oil imports in 2022. Taiwan's semiconductor exports to China and Hong Kong have suffered a decline as a result of US pressure to limit Taiwan's exports to China. According to official trade data from Taiwan, exports of integrated circuits to China and Hong Kong decreased by 27% in the first quarter of 2023 compared to the same period in the previous year, while exports to the United States increased by 9.3%, and exports to the rest of the world remained unchanged. Although the U.S. currently only accounts for a meager 1.8% share of Taiwan's integrated circuits exports, compared to China and Hong Kong's combined 58%, Taiwan's exports of ICs to the US market doubled in 2020-2022 after a long-term decline.

Due to sanctions, not only China's trade of semiconductors but also its trade of chip machinery has suffered. After experiencing long-term growth, China's imports of machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semiconductor devices and integrated circuits decreased by 12% in 2021–2022, whereas Taiwan's imports increased by 47%.

Conclusion

Morris Chang, retired TSMC founder said that efforts to contain China were leading to a split in the global supply chain that would likely increase prices and could have an effect on chip availability. There's no question in my mind that, in the chip sector, globalization is dead. Free trade is not quite that dead, but it's in danger, Chang said. The U.S. started their industrial policy on chips to slow down China's progress. China’s semiconductor industry still lags behind that of Taiwan by about five or six years in terms of technology, according to Chang.

Despite great development and progress in the manufacturing sector, as well as conquering world markets, China still needs cutting-edge parts, devices, and sophisticated technology to produce them locally. Leading-edge chips fabrication is incredibly difficult. Without access to western technology, there are a long way for China to develop its capabilities in chips technologies, mainly for production of 3nm and 5nm chips.

Unrestricted access to the global semiconductor market, particularly for cutting-edge chips from Taiwan, is crucial for China. The import of sophisticated chips is necessary for China to produce high-tech products, broaden its export basket, and enter new markets.

High-technology and related trade represent the most significant conflicts between the United States and China. The focus of the U.S.-China technology war is on silicon chips, which are geographically centered in Taiwan. Taiwan is a key player in supplying the required cutting-edge silicon chips to China. Taiwan's key role has become increasingly crucial for China, particularly due to the imposition of stricter sanctions on China by U.S. companies.

It must consider three important matters: supply chain disruption, the dependence of Taiwan's chips suppliers to the China market, and China as the main market for semiconductors. These are discussed below.

1. China has become a more important player in the semiconductor trade than the United States. Supply chain of semiconductors and also electronic devices will disrupt because of imposing more severe restrictions and sanctions on China. Greater China accounted for more than half of world integrated circuits trade. China is the growth engine of semiconductor parts and electronic devices. 55% of world’s integrated circuits exports are directed to China and Hong Kong.
China has become a more important player in the semiconductor trade than the United States. China exports more than three times and imports more than seven times the amount of integrated circuits and electronic components compared to the U.S.

2. Integrated circuits played a vital role in Taiwan's exports with a share of 38% and balance of payment, imposing severe sanctions on ICs exports to China poses challenges for Taiwan's economy, as other markets are unable to absorb Taiwan's ICs exports in the absence of China. The Taiwan silicon chip industry is oriented towards Asian markets and not the U.S or Europe. The U.S. market is not as important for Taiwan's semiconductor producers as China. Asia's share of Taiwan's total integrated circuit exports is 96% in 2022, of which China and Hong Kong account for around 60%, while the U.S. share is 1.8%.

Given Taiwan's crucial role in the semiconductor industry and its geopolitical complexities, any tensions between the United States and China can impact the global supply chain of silicon chips. Disruptions in the production or supply of semiconductors from Taiwan could have far-reaching consequences for various industries and economies worldwide.

3. China is the leading producer of mass market consumer electronic devices, making it the biggest market for semiconductors. In 2021, China exported $623 billion worth of telecommunication, electronic data processing, and office equipment, accounting for 40% of the total global exports. In contrast, the U.S. exported $93 billion. China enjoyed a trade surplus of $466 billion for these products in 2021, while the U.S. faced a trade deficit of $247 billion.

It is natural for the United States to be cautious about China's use of advanced technologies that have been developed with great investment and effort over decades in this country. Advanced technology is not the same as low- and medium-technology, such as the production of clothing and household appliances, which the U.S. is willing to easily give to China. The United States has expressed concerns over China's growing technological capabilities and its ambitions to become a global leader in advanced technologies, including semiconductors. The U.S. government has raised national security concerns related to China's access to critical technologies, including the potential misuse of advanced chips for military purposes or the infringement of intellectual property rights.

Chinese companies are making significant strides in addressing critical challenges, including the shift from being an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) to ODM (original design manufacturer), and ultimately OBM (original brand manufacturer). They are moving away from simply copying products to innovating and embracing the transition from low-tech to high-tech exports. As a result, they are aiming to be a global technology market leader and not just the factory of the world. This development may not be good news for Western companies that have relied on China as a low-cost production hub for their branded goods. China is no longer content to be just a production service provider. The trade and technology wars emerge when China's competition with the world's tech giants intensifies, posing a serious threat, especially in crucial areas of leading technologies.

Many United States companies have invested in China, and a lot of them rely on China to supply various items, from parts to finished goods. There are strong economic and trading ties relationships between the U.S. and China. Therefore, while a military conflict is far from imminent, a cold tech war will likely continue and may even intensify. The United States aims to control and limit China's progress in sensitive and potentially advanced technologies as much as possible. The scope and scale of the technology war between the United States and China will depend on complicated factors such as the economic endurance, risk-taking, and bargaining power of the stakeholders.

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